

International Relations in the Far East and Russia in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Omonov Abror Qurbonovich

National University of Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek

After the "Meiji Revolution" of 1868, capitalism in Japan grew at a particularly high rate. Japan also felt the need for colonization. Therefore, Japan took active steps, first and foremost, to Korea and Manchuria. Japanese Foreign Minister Maro Ito announced that if China's interests in Korea are only historically important, Japan's interests will be linked to economic needs.

Introduction

Ito advocated the signing of a treaty with Russia on the division of China [1, p.14-15]. Serious aggravation of the struggle in the Far East began in the 1880s. Russia was not ready for it at all. Amurbouï and Primorie were repatriated to Russia under the 1858-1860 Treaty between Russia and China, where the establishment of economic colonialism was slow. In 1897 the population in the Amur region was 120,000, in Primorie and in Kamchatka - 224,000, in Sakhalin - 28,000, and in a large country - 376,000. Baykalort had a population of 672,000. Roads were in poor condition, and industry and agriculture were underdeveloped in the region. Farmers in the center of the country were in a desperate situation and were subjected to cruelty. That is why they were reluctant to move to Amuroi.

Main part

Until 1894, the Russian government, recognizing its weakness, sought to pursue friendly policies with its neighbors China and Japan. The Russian ambassador to Tokyo, in a directive to Khitrov, explicitly stated the goal of "maintaining not only peace, but friendly relations with both neighbors."

Because "Japan and China were powerful states, while the Russian Far East did not develop" [2, p.10]. Russia has developed trade relations with China and Japan. Trade was carried through Vladivostok, where tax-free trade (porto-franco) was introduced, and trade was also intensified in the frontier cities of Kyakhtu, Blagoveshchensk, Irkutsk, Biysk and other cities. In addition, the exchange trade with Manchuria, Mongolia, Tuva has been extensively developed. Russia imported cotton to the east, cotton fabrics, linen, metal items, sugar, silver, tea, silk, porcelain, and more. Trade with Russia was particularly beneficial to China: the profits from the trade would benefit China, as China would provide silver, did not import Russian pens, and did not expel slaves (Chinese workers). In England, the slave traders took away slaves. In order to gain the right to import black opium, England and France had waged war with China and gained privileges.

Russia was regarded by Britain as its main enemy in the Far East, and underestimated Japan's aggression. The Russian government, preparing to repel the British attack, had planned to build the Trans-Siberian Railway from the 1880s onwards. The construction of this road began only after 1890, when King Alexander III was informed that Britain was attempting to obtain a concession on the railway from Beijing to Hunchun (100 km from Vladivostok). In 1892, the Minister of Finance S.

Witte introduced a program for the use of the Siberian highway not only for strategic but also economic purposes. Its essence was that Russia would be able to enter China and Korea economically, gain profitable concessions, and expand transit trade between the West and the East through Russia. The plan also envisaged military protection in the Far East. However, this work could only take place from 1910 onwards when strong fleets and military ports were put into operation. Such opportunities are inextricably linked with the continuation of friendly relations with China, Japan and Korea. The foreign policy, however, was a sign that the plan could not be realized. In 1894, Japan invaded Korea and then started a war with China. Under the Simonoseki treaty of 1895, Japan received enormous counterfeits from the defeated China, the Liaodun Peninsula and a number of islands. China has given up protection against Korea. At the initiative of the Russian government, three major powers - Germany, France, and Russia - demanded Japan to abandon the Liaodun Peninsula as an ultimatum. Japan has withdrawn from Liaodun with additional sanctions from China. As a result, protests broke out in Japan, and the Japanese government adopted a decade-long plan to prepare for war with Russia.

Vitte succeeded in partially implementing his economic expansion plan to China. In 1895, Russia issued a large loan of 150 million roubles to China to pay for the breach. The same year the Russian-Chinese Bank was established. In 1896, Li-hunchjan, the head of Chinese policy, arrived in Moscow to attend the royal crown. He signed an agreement with Japan on the establishment of a defense alliance and the construction of the China-Eastern Railway (KVJD - Kitaysko-Vostochnaya jeleznyaya doroga) in Manchuria. The construction of this railroad would link Chita with Vladivostok. The concession was transferred to the Russian-Chinese Bank, which established the KVJD Society [3, p.78] The company acquired such rights as construction of the SVDD, land management, underground mining and coal production in the allocated area. The concession was granted for 80 years. The construction of the KVJD began in 1897, and in 1901 the first train came along the road.

By this time the king was greatly influenced by a group of individuals led by retired Guards officer AM Bezobrazov. The group was known as the "Bezobrazov gang", who accused Witte of submitting to Japan and demanding that he launch an attack. In 1897, Russia introduced a naval squadron to Port Arthur, and then signed an agreement with China to lease the Liaodun Peninsula for a period of 25 years, and to build a railway from the KVJD to Port Arthur. Russia acquired freezing ports: Port Arthur - military port and Dalny (Dalny) trade ports. Both ports were soon rebuilt. Especially the port of Dalny has been declared open to ships of all countries.

In 1900, Russia, along with other great powers, participated in the suppression of an uprising by the Ihetuan society in China. [4, p.141]

1903 was a time of exchange of notes between Russia and Japan. The Japanese demanded Manchuria to withdraw Russian troops and to acknowledge their right to Korea. Russia's response was uncertain. Far Eastern politics was largely in the hands of the "Bezobrazov gang". In July 1903, he became deputy in the Far East and was appointed Admiral EE Alekseev as Port Arthur's deputy. He was also a supporter of Bezobrazov. Interior Minister Pleve also supported the "Bezobrazov gang", arguing that a "small victory war" needed to keep the public out of the revolution. Witte resigned. In the second half of 1903, Japan tightened its demands, and on December 31, presented the ultimatum to Russia. Seeing the immediate threat of the war, the Tsarist government. He was forced to compromise on the Korean issue. However, the reply telegram was sent too late on January 22, 1904, and the Japanese government had already decided to start the war.

By 1904, there were about 100,000 troops stationed in various locations. The troops were difficult to locate because the Siberian highway in the Baykalskiy division had not been completed yet (it only ended in 1905). In 1903, the railroad's capacity was 2 trains a day, while one division could hold up to 20 eschelles. The Siberian units were well-represented in the battles, but from the west the troops were dispatched in time of peace, consisting of quickly formed, disorganized and well-trained soldiers and barracks officers. Even during the war, most of the best troops were held in the center and thrown against the revolution. The officers were not well prepared. [5, p.110.]

Japan and the United States were very helpful in preparing for the war because they considered Russia their main enemy in the Far East. They gave Japan credit money, set up ships for it, and supplied weapons. In the war, maritime dominance was crucial. Russia has not yet completed the program for building a naval vessel for the Pacific squadron. In addition, in 1902, with the lack of a repair base in the east, three old bronzedets and four cruisers were taken from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea for repairs. Although the Japanese were largely invisible in the Far East by the number of bronzedets and heavy cruisers (Japan - 14, Russia - 11), they were superior to ordinary cruisers and land mines. By the beginning of the war, the total number of ships was 80 in Japan and 63 in Russia. There were 10 Russian ships in Vladivostok and 27 Japanese ships protecting the Korean cruise. But Japan's main advantage was as the ships [7, p.67]

Conclusion

The Russian government has underestimated the role of the fleet in the ongoing war. Russia would win the war if it dominated the sea, and the Japanese troops could not enter Manjuria. Recently, Russia has refused to buy two modern bronzed cruisers from Argentina, bought by Japan. The Japanese command plans to attack and attack the Russian fleet and then destroy it, then capture troops in Korea and Port Arthur, to capture the fort, and quickly and severely defeat the Russian army before the Russian reserves arrive. He was planning to acquire KVJD.

However, despite having an extensive network of spies, the Japanese misjudged the Russian fleet, the Russian army, and the Port Arthur garrison, which led to the prolongation of the war [6.p.77]. The Russians' plan was unclear. It was intended to protect Port Arthur and Vladivostok from the sea and land, the gradual withdrawal of the Russian army from the KVJD road, the conduct of local battles and the mobilization of large forces in the Harbin district. The plan underestimated the great strategic importance of Port Arthur, overestimating the strength of the Russian squadron in the Pacific and putting the initiative in the hands of Japan. Thus, Japan was ready for war in early January 1904.

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